The financial crisis: Initial conditions, basic mechanisms, and appropriate policies.


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Munich lecture, November 2008

1. Introduction

- Much too early to give a definitive assessment.
- Not too early to think about the basic mechanisms, and whether/how we can prevent similar events in the future.
- A first pass, in the midst of the action. With thanks to the IMF team.

The basic question: How could such a small trigger have such enormous effects on world output?



Funds Accounts; World Federation of Exchanges.

Organization

- Initial conditions
- Two amplification mechanisms
- Interconnections and dynamics
- Implications for policy now and in the future

Setting the stage: Initial conditions


• The trigger: The issuance of risky assets, with undervaluation of risk. Subprime mortgages.

Causes? Large world demand for safe assets, and bad regulation.

- The determinants of amplification.
 - Complexity and opacity of assets on balance sheets of financial institutions, so low liquidity.

Causes? Better risk allocation, and bad regulation.

Increased leverage (lower capital relative to assets).
 Causes? Bad, and sometimes perverse regulation.



Amplification mechanism 1. Runs

- Bad (or doubtful) assets on balance sheets
- Runs (not only by depositors, but by other investors)
- Need to sell assets.
- Not enough deep pocket investors to buy.
- Firesale prices. P < ENPV.
- Worse balance sheets. More incentives to run, etc

Amplification mechanism 2. Capital

- Bad (or doubtful) assets on balance sheets
- Decrease in capital ratio (Assets minus liabilities, over Assets)
- Need to sell assets (deleverage)
- Not enough deep pocket investors to buy.
- Firesale prices. P < ENPV.
- Lower capital ratio. More incentives to sell assets, etc


The two mechanisms: Conceptually separate but strongly interacting

- Run on financial institution 1
- Cut credit to financial institution 2
 - Sale of assets at depressed prices
 - Low capital, so further sales
 - Or cut credit to financial institution 3


Examples. From US banks to Hungary. From subprimes to other assets.

The dynamics in real time


- Increase in probability of insolvency.
- Increase in counterparty risk.
- Decrease in volume and maturity of interbank lending.
- Contagion across institutions. From direct exposure to subprime onwards.
- Contagion across countries. From the US to Europe, to emerging market countries.
- Increasing effects on the ultimate borrowers: households and firms.




Counterparty risk: Difference between the lending rate between banks and the riskless rate



Emerging market spreads







Financial policies for the short run

Need to dampen/eliminate the two amplification mechanisms.

• Runs: Provide liquidity to a broader set of institutions.

Done. Still problem with institutions, countries without access to lender of last resort (lceland).

- Capital.
 - Buy bad assets. For two reasons: Clarify price. Move price closer to EPDV.
 - Increase capital.

Many institutions may still need recapitalization. So need to add capital (buy shares).


• Second leg takes time to implement. May need guarantees for depositors, and for interbank claims. To start interbank lending.


Basic financial architecture in place in advanced countries

- A crucial weekend in October, but:
- Problems with speed/scope of recapitalization
- Coherence across countries
- Still hidden land mines. for example: CDS positions.
- Problems in emerging market countries.


Sudden stops. Need access to international liquidity provision.







Sovereign spreads since September



From the financial crisis to the economic crisis

• Not a side show.


Direct effects: Credit growth, stock prices, exchange rates Indirect effects, through confidence, and wait and see

• A Keynesian recession


Worsens the financial crisis


Back to fiscal and monetary policy (in addition to financial policies)






Decrease in confidence







Looking forward. How to avoid a repeat?

- Back to the trigger and the two mechanisms:
- To limit the build up of systemic risk.
 Broader regulation and monitoring systemic risk.
 Limit leverage.

More transparent pricing and tracing of assets. Centralized trading rather than over the counter.

• For runs: Broader liquidity provision.

Across institutions, in exchange for regulation,

Across countries, for runs on claims in foreign currency.

• For capital: Procyclical capital ratios.

A public fund to purchase illiquid assets at ENPV - x?

The international dimension

- Need to coordinate regulation, national policies. Ireland and unilateral guarantees.
- Need to monitor risk at a global level.

Exposure of Austria and Belgium to Hungary, of France to Belgium. Exposure of emerging markets to sudden stops.

- Need to organize multilateral liquidity provision. Swaps, and the new IMF facility.
- Need for burden sharing rules if recapitalization. National approaches have large spillovers.